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Abstract
The Interim Accord ruling of the International Court ofljustice is a renewed challenge from an
international court to international organizations. The Court pierced the veil ofNA TO and disre-
garded NATO's indispensable position. It implied that member-States could not avoid responsibil-
ity by hiding behind the corporate veil of an international organization. In the final analysis, this
ruling constitutes a phase in the constructive process of international relations.
I. Introduction
The Interim Accord ruling of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) points to an impor-
tant development in international law: the ICJ demonstrated that it was ready to pierce
the corporate veil of international organizations (IOs) and remove their relevance in a
legal dispute between a Member State of the IO and an outsider country.'
IOs are founded to solve coordination problems between governments; they help create
mutual understanding and cooperation. They offer a common venue for the representa-
tives of governments in a variety of fields and help deal with global problems. Yet, IOs
have one ultimate and not-openly-discussed function: the opportunity given to countries
to avoid international responsibility. IOs assume and cover the individual responsibilities
of States. Put in simpler terms, they become scapegoats for the individual faults, deficien-
cies, and actions of member countries on the international stage. An IO is an organization
to refer to when governments do not want to challenge their counterparts head-on but
want to provide a shelter for themselves. IOs give members leverage over non-members.
Nevertheless, the Interim Accord ruling of the ICJ runs contrary to that understanding.
The ruling makes it clear that an 10 cannot prevent the international community from
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pinpointing the wrongdoing Member State.2 Member States cannot be covered under the
corporate veil of an 10 in order to avoid liability. The Interim Accord ruling makes it
possible to hold a member country responsible notwithstanding the protection of the I0.3
To put the Interim Accord ruling in context, this article examines the rulings of three
courts: the ICJ, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the European Court
ofJustice (ECJ). The ICJ is an organ of the United Nations (UN) and the universal court.
The ECtHR is a very active court with a high level of prestige. It embodies the pro-active
stance of international courts after the Second World War, with a focus on human rights.
It has been dealing with governments and IOs for a very long time. As for the ECJ, it is
an interesting court in that it has an active policy of forming the European Union as a
community of law and represents the judicial dimension of a sui generis 10, which has
intricate relationships with both its Member States and other IOs. In short, these three
international courts implicate three IOs-the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Euro-
pean Union-and help concretize the relationship between international courts, govern-
ments, and IOs.
This paper puts forward the point that the position of IOs is determined by its interac-
tion with international courts and governments. The paper proceeds as follows: first, it
provides a summary of the Interim Accord ruling; second, it considers the piercing of the
corporate veil; third, it discusses the concept of an indispensable third party; fourth, it
delves into a theoretical view of the Interim Accord ruling; and lastly, it concludes that the
Interim Accord ruling constitutes a phase of the constructive process of international relations.
II. Summary of the Interim Accord Ruling
Greece and the Republic of Macedonia have been locked in a dispute concerning the
name of the latter since Greece argued that the term "Macedonia" has irredentist conno-
tations in respect of Greece and should be removed or qualified.4 The Republic of Mace-
donia objects, stating that no country has the right to interfere with its name choice; it is
an identity issue and concerns Macedonia's sovereign rights.5 This dispute started just
after the Republic's proclamation of independence in 1991 and was addressed by a 1995
Interim Accord-an international treaty-between the two countries. 6 Under this accord,
the "Republic of Macedonia" is provisionally to be referred to in all IOs as the "Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYRM), until the final settlement of the name issue,
and Greece is not to object to the membership of the FYRM to IOs. 7
The deal represented a compromise between the two countries and worked well until
the 2008 Bucharest Summit of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At that
summit, NATO declared that the FYRM could not join unless it solved its name problem
with Greece.8 This was a blow to the membership aspirations of the FYRM and induced
2. Id. T 124-26.
3. Id.
4. Id. T 16.
5. Id. 15.
6. Id. 11 15, 20.
7. Id. 185.
8. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Bucharest Sununit Declaration, 049 1 20
(Apr. 3, 2008), available at http-//www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/officialtexts_8443.htm?mode=pressrelease
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the FYRM to initiate proceedings against Greece before the ICJ.9 The FYRM argued
that Greece breached its commitment not to object to the entry of the FYRM to an 10.10
Indeed, the ICJ found that Greece had objected to the membership of the FYRM to
NATO, and this was held to be in violation of the Interim Accord. 1
Nevertheless, this ruling cannot be seen as a simple case of the pacta sunt servanda obli-
gation of Greece. Rather, it implicates three significant questions. First, how can the ICJ
pinpoint and blame Greece alone even though NATO's decision not to invite Macedonia
to the organization was taken by consensus? This is the question regarding piercing the
corporate veil. Second, isn't NATO an indispensahle third party to the issue before the ICJ?
Can the ICJ isolate the dispute between Greece and Macedonia and exclude NATO from
the equation? Third, this paper considers whether a theory could be advanced to explain
the Interim Accord ruling.
M. Piercing the Corporate Veil
The ICJ stated in the Interim Accord ruling that it did not target NATO.12 The ruling
was merely about the Greek objection to the Macedonian entry to NATO, not the NATO
rejection of the FYRM as such.13 But it can be argued that NATO was subtly targeted.
By sanctioning a NATO member country (Greece), NATO's consensus decision to reject
Macedonia's membership was circumvented and indirectly questioned. In other words,
the ICJ isolated Greece's objection to Macedonia's membership and declared it illegal.
Regardless of the institutional framework provided by NATO, a NATO member State
was held responsible.
Nonetheless, there have been cases of governments being held directly responsible re-
gardless of the institutional cover provided by the IOs. Governments could be held liable
even when they merely implement the decisions of the IOs of which they are members.
For instance, the Matthews ruling of the ECtHR made it clear that the United Kingdom-
notwithstanding the European Community (EC) Council Decision 76/787 and the 1976
Act laying out the procedure for the European Parliament elections-was liable for the
breach of the right to vote for residents of Gibraltar (a province of the United King-
("We recognize the hard work and the commitment demonstrated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia to NATO values and Alliance operations. We commend them for their efforts to build a multi-ethnic
society. Within the framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the
Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed
that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually
acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed with-
out delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible"). This statement was repeated in the NATO
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration and in the NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration. Press Release, NATO,
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, 044 T 22 (Apr. 4, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/nato
live/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease; NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration (Nov. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official-texts_68828.htm.
9. See generally Application of the Interim Accord, supra note 1.
10. Id. 1 1.
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dom).14 The residents of Gibraltar were prevented from voting at all in the European
Parliament elections.15 This was in violation of the right to vote-a fundamental right.16
Although the UK argued that it was merely implementing the measures as established by
the EC,17 it could not avoid its responsibility under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).18 Human rights (fundamental rights) 19 considerations prevailed over the
obligations of the United Kingdom to the EC.20 Indeed, the ECtHR does not exclude the
transfer of competences to IOs, provided that ECHR rights continue to be "secured";
member countries' responsibility therefore subsists even after such a transfer. 21
This situation was all the more endorsed by the Bosphorus ruling of the ECtHR.22 In
that case, Ireland seized a Yugoslav airliner, 23 relying on an EC measure,24 which, in turn,
was based on UN Security Council Resolution 820 (1993).25 The resolution provided that
States should impound all aircraft in their territories "in which a majority or controlling
interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating" from the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia.26 Ireland's action seemed like an encroachment on the right to property,
which is a human right. Against this, an application before the ECtHR was brought by
the Bosphorus Airlines, an airline company registered in Turkey, which leased the im-
pounded Boeing aircraft from Yugoslav Airlines. 27 The ECtHR did not find that Ireland
had breached human rights. 28 Yet, it stated that the possibility of finding a violation of
human rights and sanctioning Ireland was, theoretically, an open possibility:
the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the
Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its
membership of the organisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if,
in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Con-
vention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international
cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a "constitutional in-
strument of European public order" in the field of human rights. 29
14. Matthews v. United Kingdom, 24833/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 33 (1999), available at http://www.math.uni-
augsburg.de/stochastik/bazi/ECHR-Matthews.pdf.
15. Id. 1 7.
16. Id. IT 61, 65.
17. Id. 26.
18. Id. 65.
19. "Human rights" and "fundamental rights" are synonymous and can be used interchangeably.
20. Matthews, 24833/94 Eur. Ct. H. R. 32.
21. Id.
22. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland, 45036/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2005), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69564#{"itemid":["001-69564"l} [hereinafter Bospho-
rus].
23. Id. 9 16, 23.
24. Council Regulation 990/93, Concerning Trade Between the European Economic Community and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), art. 8, 1993 OJ. (L 102) 14, 16.
25. Id. preamble.
26. Id. art. 1.2(b).
27. Bosphorus, 45036/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 12.
28. Id. 167.
29. Id. 1 156.
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The ECtHR affirmed that if the EC system did not ensure an adequate human rights
protection level, it could intervene.30
Both the Bosphorus and Matthews rulings indicate that the corporate veil of an IO (the
EC) cannot be a bar to the human rights scrutiny of the acts of member countries. In
doing this, the ECtHR has not directly targeted the EC measures. Actually, that was not
possible because the EC was not a party to the ECHR. The EC's consent was not given
before or during the examination of its measures by the ECtHR. But the ECtHR indi-
rectly second guessed the EC measures through challenging their implementation in
member countries, and this was a sufficient cause for inferring that fundamental rights do
suffuse the international system.
Nevertheless, the context of the Interim Accord ruling is different: first of all, NATO is
different from the EC. It is a security organization that presents itself to the outside world
as monolithic and homogenous. The prime evidence for this is the lack of formal voting
and veto procedures. The North Atlantic Council-NATO's governing body-does not
take a roll-call vote.31 This has significant implications. It demonstrates the solidarity
among the NATO members. There is a complete unity of the members and the organiza-
tion. They are strongly interwoven. It is impossible to identify the members from the
institution. It is a compact community of legal destiny. Their liability is collective. This
is all the more compatible with the motivation for creating IOs. If public international
law were to create some form of residual liability for Member States, then international
law would interfere with the internal activities of IOs and might even make it unattractive
for States to establish or join IOs. 32 In this regard, it is impossible to determine defini-
tively whether Greece objected to the membership of the FYRM. It is inconceivable to
distinguish the Greek rejection from the NATO rejection. Therefore, there is no legiti-
mate way to target a NATO member State for its role in NATO decisions. NATO as-
sumes full responsibility for the decisions it takes. It is the only interlocutor for the
complainants who are unhappy with its decisions.
The decision-making mechanism of NATO consists purely of a political process.
NATO decides what is convenient for itself. In contrast to the EC, it is not a transparent
and open organization with specific voting procedures for specific issues; it is a specialized
and close organization with an informal voting procedure.33 Hence, outsiders cannot ac-
cuse it of being arbitrary. When countries coordinate with one another or cooperate, they
need to establish a point of coordination.34 NATO is a point of coordination for its mem-
bers. It is closed to the countries outside of the North Atlantic and European areas and
maintains solidarity among its members through its informal and anonymous decision-
30. Id. 1 153.
31. The North Atlantic Council, NORTH ATLANTIC TREKrY ORGANIZATION, http://www.nato.int/nato-wel
come/index.htmi (last visited July 14, 2013) [follow "North Atlantic Council" link].
32. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITITrIONAL LAw 288 (2nd ed. 2009);
Marko Milanovic & Tatjana Papic, As Bad as it Gets: The European Court of Human Rights' Behrami and Sara-
mati Decision and General International Law, 58 INr'L & Comp. L. Q. 267, 267-96 (2009).
33. HOSEYIN PAZARCI, INTERNATIONAL LAw 187 (2011) (Turkish) (Pazarci makes a distinction between
"closed" and "open" organizations. He argues that "open" international organizations adopt majority voting
whereas "closed" organizations work on a unanimity basis).
34. JACK L. GOLDsMrrH & ERIc A. POSNER, THE LLMIrrs OF INrERNATIONAL LAw 36 (2005).
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making procedure. 35 Likewise, there is no transparent legal criterion for being a member
of NATO. One cannot legally accuse NATO of not accepting the membership applica-
tion of a country. There is no legal requirement of taking in a new member. The criteria
of accepting new members are not legal, but political. NATO has been, from the start,
seen as a political club aiming at security and common defense of its members, not as a
legalistic institution such as the EC. Thus, the veil of NATO is a strictly political and
closed one. 36
Second, NATO is different from the other organizations of which the FYRM became a
member thanks to the lifting of the veto by Greece. For instance, neither the Council of
Europe nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe embodies the close
relationship seen between the members of NATO. NATO is an organization that under-
takes military interventions, and this requires a special relationship among its members.
That is why the FYRM's membership to those other organizations did not pose a prob-
lem, but it may pose one to NATO.37
Third, the EC is more committed to human rights than NATO. There are provisions
in EC treaties38 and ECJ jurisprudence 39 in the field of human rights. Moreover, these
provisions and jurisprudence make specific reference to the ECHR.40 Thus, when the
ECtHR adjudged the implementation of EC measures in member countries, it was well
aware that there was a parallel between the fundamental rights vision of the EC and the
ECHR system.
Fourth, the identity of the courts plays an important role. The ECtHR is the court of
Europe and claims to establish a "European Public Order."41 The ICJ is the universal
world court, which hands down rulings for the greater international community, unlike
the ECtHR, which gives rulings for a closely-knit public order. The countries in Europe
share a more or less similar worldview and embody a community of nations whereas the
ICJ cannot claim to adjudicate for a similar community. Hence, on a theoretical level, the
intervention of the ECtHR in the affairs of the EC should be easier than the ICJ's inter-
vention in the affairs of NATO.
Fifth, in the Interim Accord ruling of the ICJ, human rights are not an issue. The ten-
sion there is not between human rights concerns of individuals on the one hand and the
implementation of an 10 measure by the member country on the other. What concerns
the ruling is the application for membership by the FYRM to NATO and whether Greece
35. What is NATO?, NORn ATLANTIc TREATY ORGANIZATION, http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/in-
dex.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union art. 6, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13; see generally Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 14, 2007, 2009 O.J. (C 303) 1.
39. See, e.g., case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle ffir Getreide und
Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1 3; Case 4/73, Nold v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 491, T 13; Case 44/79,
Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 15; Case 112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R.
1-5659, 1 17.
40. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Int'l Found.
v. Council of the European Union and Comm'n of the European Cmty, 2008 E.R.C. 283, available at http:/
/eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=CELEX:62005JO402:EN:HTML [hereinafter Kadi].
41. Loizidou v. Turkey (No. 15318/89), 310 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 93 (1995), available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=695797&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnum
ber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1 166DEA398649.
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objected to this membership in contravention of its obligation not to object under Article
11 of the Interim Accord between Greece and the FYRM. Indeed, being fully aware of
this, the FYRM rested its case on Article 11 of the Interim Accord-a contractual right
that provides that "[Greece] agrees not to object to the application by or the membership
of the Party of [FYRM] in international, multilateral and regional organizations and insti-
tutions of which [Greece] is a member." 42
But this provision is to be evaluated in light of Article 22 of the Interim Accord, which
protects the other obligations of Greece under different international treaties and which
states that "[t]his Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it
does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international
organizations."43
Under this approach, the North Atlantic Treaty-which established NATO-is to be
considered under the constraint of Article 22. Thus, Article 11 is to be limited by Article
22, and the balance between these two provisions strengthens the position of Greece. The
clash is between the two articles of the Interim Accord, not between fundamental rights
and a country's implementation measures. Human rights are inherent and natural rights
for all individuals. But no country has the inherent and natural right to be a member of an
10. Be that as it may, the ICJ demonstrated judicial activism by pinpointing both Greece
in the whole of NATO and Article 11 in the Interim Accord. In doing this, the ICJ
behaved as if a "fundamental right" of Macedonia was breached by Greece-that is, the
fundamental right to join IOs.
IV. Indispensable Third Parties
The Matthews and Bosphorus rulings demonstrate that governments cannot put forward
IOs as scapegoats when those countries do not fulfill their human rights duties.44 The
most important inference is that the organization is not seen as an indispensable party to
cases brought against the countries concerned.45 In effect, a measure of the organization
is challenged and questioned by the ICJ.46 But the ICJ avoids any direct confrontation
whatsoever with IOs. 47 Rather, the ICJ targets the governments' implementation of mea-
sures in violation of human rights.4 8 It is not the source, but concrete measures taken by
individual states that become the object of contention and the target of sanction before the
ICJ.49
42. Application of the Interim Accord, supra note 1, art. 11.
43. Id. art. 22.
44. See generally, Matthews, 24833/94 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1[ 33; Bosphorus, 45036/98 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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Nevertheless, international law functions through consent.50 This is all the more true
of the ICJ; it cannot deal with the legal dispute of a country without its consent.5 To be
sure, a ruling by the ICJ may touch upon the legal interests of a third party. The problem
is to determine the threshold where the participation of the third party in the dispute
becomes indispensable. The ICJ's Monetary Gold judgment emphasized this point; if the
legal interest of a third party, which does not have to consent to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ, constitutes the very olyect of the dispute, it is not judicially proper to decide the dis-
pute.52 On this rationale, the 2008 NATO decision not to invite the FYRM for member-
ship constituted the basis of the dispute-the very olyect of the dispute.5 3 Nevertheless,
NATO was not a party to the dispute before the ICJ.54 To be sure, the ICJ is an inter-
state court.55 IOs-such as NATO-cannot be a party to the proceedings. Still, this ob-
stacle could be circumvented through instituting proceedings against all the NATO mem-
ber countries.56
The concept of an indispensable third party needs further clarification. For instance,
the Nauru v. Australia ruling of the ICJ affirmed that the dispute between Nauru and
Australia did not require the participation of New Zealand and the UK for its resolution.57
The determination of the responsibility of New Zealand and the UK was not necessary to
determine the responsibility of Australia.58 Although these three governments altogether
constituted an Administrative Authority for Nauru, the ICJ found Australia alone eligible
to come before the ICJ for its actions as regards the administration of the national re-
sources of Nauru.59 The interests of New Zealand and the UK did not constitute the very
subject matter of the decision to be rendered by the ICJ.60 An explanation to this ratio-
nale would be that the Administrative Authority, as established under the 1947 Trustee-
ship Agreement on Nauru, did not have a legal personality. 61 There was a loose
cooperation between the three administrator governments, and it was easy to get at one of
them. But NATO has a legal personality, and it is not possible to render Greece alone
responsible.
The Congo v. Uganda ruling by the ICJ is similar to the Nauru v. Australia ruling.62
Uganda argued that Congo could not bring it before the ICJ without, at the same time,
having Rwanda in the proceedings. 63 Rwanda occupied the Congolese territory at the
50. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J.
19, 32 (June 15).
51. Statute of the I.CJ. art. 36, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docu
ments/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER I.
52. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, 1954 I.CJ. at 33.
53. See generally NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, supra note 8.
54. Application of Interim Accord, supra note 1, 1 1.
55. See The Court, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/courtlindex.php?pl=1
(last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
56. Id.
57. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 1992 I.CJ. 240, 1 55-57 (June 26).
58. Id.
59. Id. $1 11, 55-57.
60. Id. T 55-57.
61. Id. 47; MALcolm N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1297 (6th ed. 2008).
62. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.CJ. 168 (Dec.
19).
63. Id. 197-98.
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same time as Uganda and thus, so argued Uganda, holding only Uganda responsible for
the events in Congo was not possible.64 On this approach, the ICJ should have found the
claim relating to Uganda's responsibility for these events inadmissible. But the Court
responded that the interests of Rwanda did not constitute the "very subject-matter" of the
decision to be rendered by it and that it was not necessary for Rwanda to be a party to the
case. 65 As in the Nauru v. Australia case, in the Congo v. Uganda case, there was no 10
with a legal personality to which the acts of the respondent country could be attributed.
Thus, it was not difficult for the ICJ to dismiss the arguments based on the collective
responsibility of the third country. The loose relationship between the respondent and
the third country gave the opening to the ICJ to dismiss the indispensable role of the third
country.
The state of affairs changes when there is an 10 (an entity with a legal personality).
The joined Behrami and Saramati ruling of the ECtHR was the harbinger of such defer-
ence to IOs and the importance of the indispensable third party. 66 The Behrami case
concerned the demining of Kosovo.67 After being exposed to undetonated cluster bomb
units (CBUs), Gadaf Behrami died while his brother Bekim was disfigured and lost his
sight.68 The father of the two children, Agim Behrami, instituted proceedings against
France at the ECtHR.69 He argued that the incident took place because of the failure of
the French Kosovo Force troops (KFOR) to mark and/or defuse the undetonated CBUs,
which those troops knew to be present on that site. 70 As for the Saramati case, the issue
was the pre-trial detention of Mr. Saramati. 71 He directed his complaint against Norway
and France whose contingents in the KFOR detained him. 72
At the time, Kosovo was being administered by the KFOR and the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as authorized by Security Council
Resolution 1244.73 Both were functioning under the authority of the United Nations.
The ECtHR held that the applicants' complaints were incompatible ratione personae with
the provisions of the ECHR Convention; the ECtHR dismissed the application as inad-
missible on the grounds that the actions complained against were "directly attributable to
the UN."74 It affirmed that the impugned acts-the lack of de-mining and the arbitrary
pre-trial detention-were not attributable to Norway and France. 75 Having reached this
conclusion, the ECtHR stated, with regards to applying the ECHR provisions to the UN,
that to subject the acts of UNMIK and KFOR to the scrutiny of the ECtHR would be "to
64. Id. 91 174, 176-78.
65. Id. 11 196-204.
66. Behrami & Behrami v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80830#{"iternid":["001-80830"]}.
67. Id. 11 51-60.
68. Id. 1 5.
69. Id. 11.
70. Id. 1 61.
71. Id. 1 8.
72. Id. 1 63.
73. Id. 1 4.
74. Id. 91 151-52.
75. Id. 1 151.
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interfere with the fulfillment of the United Nation's key mission in this field including...
with the effective conduct of its operations."7 6
Hence, the UN was seen as the indispensable party-a distinction between France and
Norway on the one hand and the UN on the other hand was not made. As additional
support, the ECtHR distinguished the Bebrami and Saramati case by underlining that the
impugned acts did not take place in the territories of France or Norway whereas the im-
pugned act in the Bosphorus ruling (the Irish seizure of the aircraft) took place in the terri-
tory of Ireland.77 Moreover, the ECtHR argued that there was a close hierarchy between
the UN authorities and the French and Norwegian agents on the ground in Kosovo
whereas Ireland had certain autonomy in regard to the impugned act it took with regard
to the applicant.78 Thus, there was a possibility for Ireland to be individually liable in the
Bosphorus ruling, but the French and Norwegian authorities could not be individually lia-
ble in the Bebrami and Saramati ruling.7 9
But this justification puts the Interim Accord ruling of the ICJ in an awkward position.
First, the objection of Greece to the FYRM's application to NATO cannot be confined to
the Greek territory-to the Greek jurisdiction. Second, the decision to reject the FYRM's
membership application was taken by NATO's North Atlantic Council, through consen-
sus. That is to say, Greece did not have the autonomy to determine the fate of the
FYRM's application. On this reading, NATO is the indispensable third party in the dis-
pute between Greece and the FYRM. There is a complete overlap between the distinct
will of NATO, as an 10, and the will of a Member State, like Greece. NATO maintains
an informal system of voting. There is no specific or formal procedure for casting a veto
in NATO. Thus, the individual responsibilities of Member States for the acts of NATO
disappear. Thereby, the institutional effectiveness of NATO as a monolithic organization
is assured and allocating responsibility to individual countries is rendered impossible.
Nevertheless, the Interim Accord ruling can find some support in the Kadi judgment of
the European Court of Justice-the judicial organ of the European Union (EU).80 It is
similar in that it demonstrates no deference to an 10-the United Nations. In this case,
the anti-terrorism measures as established by the UN Security Council resolution were at
issue.8' The EU transposed the Security Council measures in the shape of a Council
regulation. 82 Under this legislation, the assets of Mr. Kadi were seized by the EU, and
this constituted an encroachment on the right to property-a fundamental right.83 But
the source of the problem was that this was done without due process and in violation of
Mr. Kadi's right to information and right to defense."'
The ECJ declared that, notwithstanding the Security Council resolution and its annex
indicating Mr. Kadi as one of the individuals whose assets were to be frozen, the right to
due procedure and human rights considerations (as established in the EU legal order)
76. Id. 1 149.
77. Id. 1 106.
78. Id. 1 151.
79. Id.
80. Kadi, 2008 E.R.C. T 283.
81. See generally S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 Uan. 16, 2002).
82. Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 OJ. (L139/9) (EC).
83. Kadi, 2008 E.R.C. 1 40.
84. Id. 1 257.
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were to be safeguarded as well.8 5 The ECJ stated that it did not judge the validity of the
Security Council resolution86 (just as the ICJ argued that it did not judge the validity of
the NATO rejection of the FYRM's membership bid). Rather, the ECJ solely affirmed
that the EU legal order, comprising fundamental rights,87 is to be complied with in the
EU jurisdiction area, whatever the ultimate source of the measures.88 The ECJ annulled
the EU Council Regulation, breaching the EU legal order.89 The UN-the universal
IO-was not deferred to, and the autonomy of the EU legal order was emphasized. In
like vein, the Interim Accord ruling gave the impression that Article 11 of the Interim
Accord between the FYRM and Greece had certain autonomy. The right to participate in
IOs was raised to the level of a fundamental right, and the ICJ acted as if it were protect-
ing the autonomy of a value, which favored the participation of countries in IOs. But the
ICJ is not the court of NATO and, most importantly, there is no such value requiring the
participation of the FYRM in NATO.
V. A Theoretical View of the Interim Accord Ruling
At this point, a constructivist interpretation of the Interim Accord ruling can be made.
Constructivism in international relations asserts that the interaction between countries and
IOs changes both sets of players in the game;90 the rules change as the governments and
IOs invoke and interpret them in particular cases, and the attitude of the IOs and govern-
ments change as their decisions and, indeed, their sovereignty are redefined by the inter-
national rules.9' The actors on the international stage consider the reactions to their
previous actions and act accordingly later on.
In that regard, the constructivist theory would argue that there are no unmovable inter-
national parameters where the positions and attitudes are fixed.92 The international sys-
tem is not based on strictly defined material conditions and nature, but on ideas and
interactions between actors. Interests and identities are formed by the process comprising
actions and reactions of international actors-governments, IOs, international courts, etc.
Human associations (a prime example of which are IOs) are determined by shared ideas,
and these shared ideas are liable to change. "Structure" is not "given," but influenced and
modified by social practice-that is, signals of international actors to each other.
Arguably, there is a specific motivation for the judicial activism of an international
court, which is the willingness to remain relevant on the international stage. The ICJ, in
the Interim Accord case, was stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it
was risking handing down a ruling without effective and practical results. There was no
guarantee that Greece would comply with the ICJ's ruling in the future. Besides, the ICJ
risked seeming too interventionist into the affairs of IOs. On the other hand, the ICJ
wanted to make its voice heard and did not want to leave the issue wholly to the political
85. Id. 9 303.
86. Id. 1 287.
87. Id. 19 283-85.
88. Id. 9 281.
89. Id. '1372.
90. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOcIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1999).
91. IAN HURD, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONs: POLrrIcs, LAW, PRACTICE 32 (2011).
92. Id.
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process. The ICJ once made a mistake of dismissing a case because of its political nature
and lack of legal interest of the applicants; this was the South West Africa ruling.93 In that
case, Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings against South Africa for the improper
treatment of South West Africa (Namibia), which was, at the time, under the Trusteeship
administration of South Africa. 94 The two governments relied on Article 7 of the Man-
date of 17 December 1920 for South West Africa, which implied erga omnes obligations of
South Africa vis-ii-vis the international community.95 Still, this was not enough to estab-
lish their locus standi before the ICJ, and the ICJ rejected the status of Ethiopia and Liberia
as applicants.96 Article 22 of the League of Covenant, which established the mandate
system as a system of "sacred trust of civilization," and the UN Trusteeship Agreement,
which made trusteeships the interest of the whole international community under the UN
Charter, 97 did not suffice.9 8 The ICJ found that there was no legal interest of those two
countries, but merely their moral, humanitarian, and political interests.99 It indicated that
the issue would be better decided by the UN Security Council (an IO).00 The 10 was
favored over governments and the Court. The judicial path was closed.
The Court suffered a loss of prestige after that ruling because colonial issues were cru-
cial, especially for African states in the 1960s. In this respect, the Court was, at first, seen
by them as an important venue to frame the issue in legal terms and the language of rights.
But the ICJ missed this opportunity and disappointed the international community. It was
so damaging to the ICJ that, in order to compensate for its decision, the ICJ went on to
establish the principle of erga omnes in a later case.' 0 It thereby signaled that it was inter-
ested in the most challenging problems of humanity and that it would not play the same
passive role that it played in the South West African case. Besides, later on, the ICJ handed
down an advisory opinion on South West Africa102 and tried to fill the legal vacuum on
the issue. This time, the interwoven nature of the political and legal aspects of the dispute
did not prevent the ICJ from looking at it through a legal lens. 03 Put differently, the
political dimension of the dispute did not prevent the ICJ from qualifying the dispute as a
legal one and adjudicating it. Rather than leaving the matter totally to governments and
IOs, the ICJ assumed responsibility. This evolution of the ICJ is a typical example of the
constructive process in international relations.
Similarly, although NATO's rejection of the FYRM's membership application was the
political decision of NATO, the ICJ still found a legal dimension to it and adjudged the
93. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), 1966 I.CJ. 6 (July 18).
94. Id. at 10-11.
95. Id.
96. Id. $1 99, 100.
97. U.N. Charter art. 88. ("[tlhe Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, eco-
nomic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering
authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report
to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire').
98. South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.CJ. at 91 17, 19, 99, 100.
99. Id. 1 99-100.
100. Id. 1 93.
101. The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 I.CJ. 3,
133 (Feb. 5).
102. See generally Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 12 (June 21).
103. Id.
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dispute. That is because this could make the ICJ irrelevant as regards its position on the
world stage when it comes to relations between IOs and non-member countries. The
number of IOs has grown immensely, and the ICJ does not want to be a mere spectator to
the developments and disputes in this dynamic field. Nevertheless, it did not want to
interfere in the affairs of an 10 (NATO) either. It avoided dictating a certain conduct to
NATO. Therefore, the ICJ limited itself to declaring that Greece acted illegally in view
of the interim accord's prohibition of objection to the membership of the FYRM to IOs.
The ICJ did not order Greece or NATO to adjust their behaviors or practices in a certain
way in the future but just determined the existence of this past illegality. The ICJ made its
voice heard and entered the constructivist process in international relations; it did not repeat
its mistake from the South West Africa ruling. Now, the ball is in the court of NATO.
NATO's practice will influence the development of international law and international
politics as regards the relationship between IOs, governments, and international courts.
VI. Conclusion
There is no fixed nature to the international legal order. It is not a "given," but a social
construct. There is a constructive process; it is continually being built, modified, and re-
built by actors-governments, international courts, and IOs. They send and receive sig-
nals as regards their positions. The knowledge and reality of IOs is constructed through
the interaction between IOs, member and non-member countries, and international
courts. Indeed, the international system is what the actors on the international stage make
it out to be.
In that regard, on the one hand, the Behrami and Saramati ruling is the epitome of a
court's deference to IOs. The South West Afica case demonstrated deference to the IOs
(the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council) as well, but, later on, the ICJ became
active by giving an Advisory Opinion on the issue. On the other hand, the Matthews,
Bosphorus, and Kadi rulings demonstrate assertive actions on the part of courts vis-a-vis
IOs, and the Interim Accord judgment is a renewed challenge from an international court
to IOs. The Interim Accord ruling of the ICJ constitutes a phase in this constructive process.
The ICJ pierced the veil of NATO and disregarded its indispensable position. This ruling is a
signal from the ICJ that a newly independent country ought not to be excluded from IOs
and the international community. In case it is excluded, the ICJ is ready to engage in the
constructive process of attempting to secure its membership.
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